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Abstract 
 
Previous research has found a link between theory of mind and cooperation. The 
aim of this study is to deepen into this relationship, to identify which theory of mind 
skills are more related to the cooperative ability on a referential communication task. 
A total of 50 children from first and fifth grade completed a battery of theory of 
mind tasks, and also a cooperative task where children worked in pairs to build 
block models. Each pair was composed by a builder and a guide, who gave 
instructions to his partner about how to build a replica of the model. The results 
show a significant relationship between the theory of mind skills and cooperation. 
Specifically, we found that the second-order false-belief task was the variable most 
related to cooperation after controlling the effect of age. In addition, we observed 
that the mentalist skills were more important for cooperation in the builders than in 
the guides. Finally, we discuss the findings of this study and make suggestions for 
the future. 
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Resumen 
 
Estudios previos han encontrado una relación entre la teoría de la mente y la 
cooperación. El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en profundizar en esta 
relación, intentando delimitar qué habilidades de TM están más relacionadas con la 
capacidad cooperativa en una tarea de comunicación referencial. Un total de 50 
niños y niñas de primero y quinto de primaria completaron una batería de tareas de 
teoría de la mente, y también una tarea de cooperación en la que por parejas debían 
reproducir modelos con piezas de construcción. En cada pareja había un constructor 
y un guía, quien daba las instrucciones a su compañero para construir una replica del 
modelo. Los resultados muestran una relación importante entre las habilidades de 
teoría de la mente y de cooperación. Más específicamente, se halló que la tarea de 
creencia falsa de segundo orden era la más vinculada con la cooperación, habiendo 
controlado el efecto de la edad. Además, se observó que las habilidades mentalistas 
fueron más importantes para la cooperación en los constructores que en los guías. 
Finalmente, se discuten los hallazgos de este estudio y se plantean futuras líneas de 
trabajo. 
Palabras clave: Teoría de la mente, cooperación, comunicación referencial.
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he ability to cooperate is an essential characteristic of human beings that is 
present in many of our daily routines. Authors like Tomasello (2009) argue 
that what makes human culture different is based on a set of specific skills 
and motivations to cooperate. In education, cooperation has been linked to 
a form of learning (Dillenbourg, 1999; Johnson & Johnson, 1979) and a teaching 
methodology which claims that learning is enhanced when students develop 
cooperative skills (Cabero, 2003). Research on cooperative learning has focused on 
testing its effectiveness compared to competitive or individualistic learning, 
showing its potential to boost students‟ social development and learning level 
(Arvaja, Salovaara, Häkkinen, & Järvelä, 2007). However, research also indicates 
that the positive effects of cooperative learning are not achieved spontaneously as a 
result of assembling the students in groups, but it is necessary to understand the 
complexity of the interaction process and to study the fundamental mechanisms 
supporting its effectiveness (Arvaja et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, the ability to cooperate has been declared by European 
authorities as one of the core competencies that any citizen must acquire in order to 
face the challenges of a globalized world (OECD, 2002). From this viewpoint, 
cooperation becomes a personal competence and its development a priority, since it 
is considered an individual capacity that allows people to be successful in teamwork. 
In this sense, the cooperative competence may be defined as the set of individual 
knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary for working effectively in teams. In this 
line, the present study aims to deepen the knowledge about the influence of 
intraindividual factors related to cooperation. More specifically, about the 
relationship between cooperation and certain skills related to social cognition, 
namely, the mentalistic or theory of mind (ToM) skills. 
By ToM we refer to the ability to attribute (represent, reason and conceptualize) 
mental states in oneself and others, as well as to understand that other people may 
have beliefs, desires and intentions different from their own. It is therefore a 
fundamental ability in humans that develops progressively from birth. In fact, 
children's understanding of mental states is a crucial cognitive development that has 
been studied intensively in the last years (Bryant, Coffey, Povinelli, & Pruett, 2013). 
ToM skills may be understood as a system of concepts and inferences that allows 
people to attribute beliefs, desires, intentions and feelings to other beings and, in that 
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way, to understand their behaviour. It also enables the understanding of deception, 
lies and false beliefs about reality, in addition to the communication and cooperation 
with others. In fact, people with problems to develop mentalistic skills, as for 
instance people with autism spectrum disorders, show significant social and 
communication difficulties (Olivar & Belinchon, 1997; Rivière & Nuñez, 1996). 
Although many of the studies on ToM have placed special emphasis on the study 
of deception or Machiavellian capacity, it is noteworthy the importance of ToM in 
the cooperative mind. Indeed, this research suggests that people with limited 
mentalistic abilities have difficulty to cooperate and perform altruistic behaviours 
(Sally & Hill, 2005; Liebal, Colombi, Rogers, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008), in 
the same way that they struggle to understand deception or pretence. 
While there is much research about ToM skills and their development (see 
Serrano (2012) for a revision), there are few studies about the role of ToM skills in 
cooperative contexts. Yet, some results, such as those obtained by Paal and 
Bereczkei (2007), directly relate ToM with cooperation skills, rather than with 
Machiavellianism. Now it is important to note that in this study with adults they 
didn‟t use a cooperative situation, but a scale to assess the cooperation level and a 
test to assess the level of Machiavellianism. On the other side, Takagishi, 
Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi and Yamagishi (2010), in a study with preschoolers, 
found a significant relationship between the understanding of false belief and 
making a fair proposal of sweets distribution in the ultimatum game. According to 
the authors, children who had not developed the ability to infer how other children 
would react to their actions, behaved more selfishly, because they did not 
understand that other children could be angry at them and punish their unfair 
behaviour. From this view, understanding and anticipating other people‟s behaviour 
may encourage cooperative behaviour and adaptation to social rules. 
A large part of the studies linking ToM with cooperation have focused on 
communication skills, using referential communication situations as cooperative 
tasks. One example is the study by Resches and Pérez-Pereira (2004), who found 
that ToM skills influence the type of communication resources children use in a 
referential communication task. This study showed the relationship between ToM 
skills and the ability to communicate effectively to cooperate on a task with a shared 
goal. Likewise, Maridaki-Kassotaki and Antonopoulou (2011) found that some 
referential communication skills were related to the understanding of first-order 
false beliefs. Using a similar task, Olivar, Flores and de la Iglesia (2004) found a 
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relationship between the capacity to understand second-order false beliefs and the 
quality of the sender's message. 
In addition to the understanding of false belief, other mentalistic skills have been 
associated with referential communication abilities. For example, Happé (1993, 
1994) found that children's performance in batteries of ToM tasks is a good 
predictor of figurative language understanding (irony, joke, metaphor...). Also 
Krych-Applebaum, Law, Jones, Barnacz, Johnson and Keenan (2007) found that 
ToM skills were related to communicative task. In this study they found that 
obtaining high scores on the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, 2003) was related 
to effective communication, but only in the case of the speaker and not the receiver. 
Finally, we must bear in mind that the ToM can be conceived not as a unit capacity, 
but as a capacity composed of various processes or dimensions (Tirapu-Ustarroz, 
Pérez-Sayes, Erekatxo-Bilbao, & Pelegrin-Valero, 2007) that despite being 
interdependent enough to form a general ability, they can also be manifested as 
separate skills. The same would occur in other human abilities, such as language, 
which is composed of different components or levels (phonological, semantic, 
syntactic...). In the case of the ToM this is controversial, and their fundamental 
components (if exist) have not yet been identified. Nevertheless, we believe that to 
further the study of the relationship between ToM and cooperation it is important to 
evaluate ToM with a battery of tasks assessing several of its processes, and not just 
one of them, as in some of the abovementioned studies. 
In short, ToM skills are linked to the effectiveness of cooperative tasks. 
However, there is a shortage of studies on that subject, along with methodological 
differences in the measurement of the ToM, primarily in terms of the tasks used. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to further study what ToM skills are related to 
cooperation. In this sense, the objective of this research focuses on investigating the 
influence of mentalistic skills of different types and complexity in a cooperative task 
of referential communication. Additionally, considering the study by Krych-
Applebaum et al. (2007), we created two distinct roles, the guide (speaker) and the 
builder (receiver), to study which mentalistic skills are more linked to cooperation in 
each role. 
We hypothesized that higher scores on ToM tasks will be associated to higher 
scores on a cooperative task. We also considered the possibility that some ToM 
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skills would be more strongly related to cooperative success than others, and that 
these relationships could depend on the role of the participants. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
The sample consisted of a total of 50 children from first and fifth grade. The 
young group consisted of 24 participants aged 6 (M = 6;6, SD = 0.03; range: 
6;0 to 6;11; 12 girls) while the older group consisted of 26 children aged 10 
(M = 10;08, SD = 0.03; range: 10;0 to 10;11; 12 girls). 
 
Procedure 
 
Data collection 
Data were collected in two sessions. In the first session ToM and 
intelligence were assessed. It lasted between 30 and 45 minutes, and was 
conducted during school hours in a quiet room of the child‟s school. The 
second session took place one week later, and participants conducted a 
cooperative task in pairs. This session was audio-visually recorded, so 
permissions from the school administration and families were obtained. 
 
Materials and scores 
The tasks administered and the scores used are described below (see also 
Appendix A). In all ToM tasks the raw score was transformed to a score of 
0-3 points with the purpose to match their weight in the total score in ToM, 
which ranged from 0 to 18 points. 
 
a. First-order false belief 
The first task was a version of the original unexpected content task proposed 
by Perner, Leekman and Wimmer (1987). In the first part of this task the 
 International Journal of Educational Psychology, 2(3) 
 
 
331 
participants were shown a closed tube of Lacasitos® sweets and were asked 
what they thought there was inside. Then they were showed the actual 
contents of the tube (pebbles). After children had seen the actual contents of 
the tube, they were asked about their previous false beliefs about these 
contents, and also were asked about the actual contents of the tube. In the 
second part of the task participants were asked about the false belief that a 
partner would have when shown the tube for the first time. They were also 
asked to justify their response. Finally, children were asked a control 
question to ensure that they really knew their partner had not seen the 
contents of the tube. 
Participants‟ answers about their own previous false belief and that of a 
companion were scored with a 0 or 1 each, considering that responding all 
control questions was a prerequisite for obtaining the points. Thus, the 
maximum score in this task was 2 points (converted to 3). 
 
b. Second-order false belief 
The understanding of the second-order false belief was assessed using a 
version of the change of location task from the Developmental 
Neuropsychological Assessment II (NEPSY - II Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 
2007). After introducing the main characters of the story (John and Mary), it 
was explained that John decided to go to one attraction (the wheel) and Mary 
to another (the carousel). Participants were then told that John finally 
decided to go to the haunted house, because there was a long queue at the 
wheel, and they were asked to predict where Mary would look for him, and 
why she would look for him there. Afterwards, participants were told that 
Mary had actually seen John going to the haunted house, though John didn‟t 
know. At this point, participants had to predict where John thought Mary 
would look for him, and justify their response. Finally, two control questions 
were asked. One point (transformed to 3 points) was given to the participants 
who correctly answered all questions, including control questions and 
justifications. 
  Sidera et al – Theory of Mind and Cooperation  
 
 
332 
 
c. Deception 
To assess the understanding of deception it was used a version of the task by 
Filippova and Astington (2008). Participants were told the story of two 
brothers: Marta, who never tells the truth, and his brother Peter, who knows 
that. In the story Peter can‟t find his soccer ball and knows that Marta has 
hidden it either in the closet or under the bed. Then participants were told 
that when Peter asks Marta where she has hid the ball, she answers under the 
bed. Next, participants were asked why Peter goes to get the ball in the 
closet (and not under the bed) and where Marta said she had hid the ball. 
One point was given to participants (transformed to 3 points) who answered 
correctly to both the test and the control questions. 
 
d. Metaphor 
The metaphor task of the NEPSY-II (Korkman et al., 2007) was 
administered, following the test procedure. First, participants were shown a 
picture of two twin sisters, and were explained that their mother says: "they 
are like two drops of water". Subsequently, participants were asked about the 
meaning of this expression. One point was given to participants who 
answered the test question correctly (converted to 3 points). 
 
e. Faux-pas 
Understanding of faux-pas situations was assessed with one of the stories 
designed by Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones and Plaisted (1999). In 
the story Cristina gives a plane as a birthday present to Manuel, and some 
months later, when the two children are playing with the plane, Cristina 
accidentally breaks it. Cristina apologizes to Manuel and he says: "Do not 
worry. I never liked this plane. Someone gave it to me for my birthday". 
Then three questions were asked: “In the story, did anyone say something 
they shouldn't have said or something awkward?” “Who said it?” and “What 
did he/she say?” If participants answered correctly to all three questions they 
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were given 1 point. A second point was given if they remembered that 
Manuel did not have a malicious intention and another point if they 
attributed the correct emotion to Cristina. Thus, the maximum score was 3 
points. 
 
f. Emotional attribution 
The contextual task of the NEPSY-II (Korkman et al., 2007) was used to 
evaluate the ability to identify the emotions of characters in different 
contexts. The task shows different black and white pictures in which a girl is 
turned back, and participants have to indicate, from four possibilities, which 
face the girl would show in a given situation. Six different situations were 
administered after a trial. Participants obtained 1 point for each correct 
situation, so the maximum score was 6 points (converted to 3 points). 
 
g. Intelligence quotient 
Participants‟ IQ was assessed through the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 
(K-BIT) elaborated by (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1994) with Spanish scales. 
This test consists of two scales: one verbal and one nonverbal. From the 
verbal scale, 6-year-olds received the expressive vocabulary task, while 10-
year-olds were administered both the expressive vocabulary and definitions 
tasks. Both groups were also administered the nonverbal matrices task. To 
analyse the results we used the percentile scores of the IQ composite score 
(which includes verbal and nonverbal scores). 
 
Cooperation task 
The procedure was based in the task used by Krych-Appelbaum et al. (2007) 
in which children work in pairs to make a copy of a model constructed by 
blocks of Lego Duplo® (see Appendix B). In each pair one of the 
participants takes the role of the guide and the other the builder. In the 6-
year-old group a total of 12 pairs of children were formed: 6 of the same sex 
(3 boy-boy and 3 girl-girl) and 6 of the opposite sex. In the 10-year-old 
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group a total of 13 pairs were formed: 7 of the same sex (4 boy-boy and 3 
girl-girl), and 6 of the opposite sex. 
Participants sat facing each other with an opaque screen between them, 
so that they could not see the working area of their partner. The guide had a 
model, and the builder, following the instructions of the guide and provided 
with 45 construction blocks, was expected to build a replica of the model. 
After a pilot test, one 4-block trial model was designed, as well as three 6-
block test models of increasing complexity. The blocks could vary in four 
dimensions: color, size, shape and position in the coordinate axis (see Table 
1). 
 
Table 1 
Dimensions considered in each model 
 
Model Colour Size Shape Axis 
Trial    x, y, z 
Model 1    x, y 
Model 2    x, y, z 
Model 3    x, y, z 
 
 
The first model to be constructed was a trial model. When participants 
considered that they had constructed a replica of it, the opaque screen 
between them was removed, so they could see how they had built the model 
and discuss it. After that, they were asked to construct the 3 test models, but 
in these cases the opaque screen was not removed and they were not allowed 
to talk. They just could see the result of their work.  
Each of the 3 test models was scored from 0 to 6 points. Therefore, the 
maximum score in the cooperation task was 18 points, which were awarded 
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as follows, considering both the correct choice of the blocks and their 
location: 0.5 points if all blocks had the correct color; 0.5 points if all blocks 
had the correct shape and size; 0.5 points if the first piece was located 
correctly; and 1 point for each of the remaining pieces located in the right 
place (or 0.5 points if they were placed incorrectly solely due to the incorrect 
location of the previous block). 
In some parts of the results section participants are divided into two 
groups: (a) participants with a "high scores on cooperation" (those who had a 
score equal or above the median, which was of 6 points); and (b) participants 
with "low scores on cooperation" (median score lower than 6). In spite of the 
fact most children from the younger group had a low score on cooperation, 
two pairs of 6-year-olds obtained a high score. Plus, two pairs of 10-year-
olds obtained a low score. Therefore, the division of the cooperation results 
in high and low does not entirely correspond to the groups of age. 
 
 
Results 
 
Cooperative abilities and theory of mind 
 
As shown in the last row of Table 2, participants obtained an average score 
of 7.24 points (SD = 4.43) in the cooperation task. In ToM, the average of 
the total score was 13.44 (SD = 3.81). If we consider the score on each of the 
ToM tasks, we observe that the best scores were obtained in the unexpected 
content task, followed by the tasks of deception, emotional attribution, 
metaphor, faux-pas and change of location. 
When we look at the performance in ToM and cooperation as a function of 
the grade of the children, we observe that fifth-graders obtained higher 
scores than first-graders. 
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Table 2 
Mean (and standard deviation) in the cooperation and ToM tasks in the total sample 
and as a function of grade 
 
Grade  COOP 
First-
order 
false 
belief 
Second-
order false 
belief 
Deception Metaphor Faux-pas 
Emotional 
Attribution 
Total 
ToM 
score 
First 
4.42 
(2.83) 
2.75 
(0.57) 
.75 
(1.32) 
2.13 
(1.40) 
1.75 
(1.51) 
1.44 
(1.36) 
1.92 
(0.50) 
10.73 
(2.82) 
Fifth 
9.85 
(4.04) 
2.83 
(.49) 
2.88 
(.59) 
2.77 
(0.82) 
2.54 
(1.10) 
2.36 
(1.14) 
2.56 
(0.48) 
15.94 
(2.76) 
All the 
Sample 
7.24  
(4.43) 
2.79 
(0.53) 
1.86 
(1.47) 
2.46 
(1.16) 
2.16 
(1.36) 
1.92 
(1.32) 
2.25 
(0.58) 
13.44 
(3.81) 
Note: range of the cooperation task = 0-18; range in each ToM task = 0-3; range of the total 
ToM score = 0-18 
 
Correlations between cooperative abilities and theory of mind 
 
In order to analyse the correlation between the ability to cooperate on a 
referential communication task and ToM skills, we performed partial 
correlations (controlling for age), both for the total sample, and as a function 
of the role in the cooperative activity. 
For the total sample the correlation was only significant (p < .05) 
between cooperation and both ToM total score (r = .34, p = .016) and change 
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of location score (r = 0.36, p = 0.011), being both correlations of low 
intensity (see Bisquerra, 2004). 
When we took into account the role of the participants in the cooperative 
activity we observed no significant correlations in the group of guides (p > 
.05), whereas in the group of builders we found a correlations of moderate 
intensity between cooperation and the following tasks: change of location (r 
= .45, p = .027), deception (r = .41, p = .049), and ToM total score (r = .50, p 
= .013). 
 
Theory of mind skills, role of the participants and success in the 
cooperative activity 
 
As the following analysis will compare the performance of the participants 
as a function of the role played in the cooperative activity (guides and 
builders) and depending on the success in this activity (high and low scores 
on cooperation), we first considered whether there were differences between 
these groups in relation to age and IQ. 
We compared builders guide as to IQ (guides: M = 57.48, SD = 26.10; 
builders: M = 45.32, SD = 27.50) and the differences were not significant 
(Mann-Whitney: p > .05). In this case we did not analyse the effect of age 
because the pairs were formed by participants of the same grade and thus, in 
both groups of guides and builders half of the participants are from the first 
grade and half of the fifth grade. 
If we compare the age of the participants with high and low cooperation 
scores (high score: M = 119.58, SD = 18.13; low score: M = 86.79, SD = 
19.99) and their IQ (high score: M = 47.46, SD = 26.82; low score: M = 
55.67, SD = 27.60), we found differences in terms of age (Mann -Whitney: 
Z = -3.50, p = .000) but not in terms of IQ (p >. 05). 
In Table 3 we show the scores of the participants in the cooperation and 
ToM tasks in terms of the role of the participants and their high or low 
scores on cooperation. We observed that guides outperformed builders in the 
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tasks of deception, metaphor and faux-pas, as well as in the total ToM score. 
On the other side, builders showed better results on the unexpected content 
and change of location tasks. However, the contrasts were only significant (p 
<.05) in the faux-pas task. 
Analysing the relation between high/low success in the cooperative task 
and ToM scores (see Table 3), we observed that participants with low scores 
on cooperation outperformed the group with high scores in unexpected 
content task, but the differences were not significant (p > .05). In the rest of 
ToM tasks, as well as in the total ToM score, participants with high scores 
on cooperation outperform their peers with low scores. These differences 
were statistically significant for the following tasks (p < .05): change of 
location, deception, metaphor, emotional attribution and total ToM score. 
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Table 3 
Mean (and standard deviation) in the cooperation and ToM tasks as a function of 
the role of the participants and the level of success in the cooperative task 
 
 COOP 
First-
order 
false 
belief 
Second-
order false 
belief 
Deception Metaphor 
Faux-
pas 
Emotional 
Attribution 
Total 
ToM 
score 
Guides 
N = 25 
7.24 
(4.47) 
2.76 
(0.56) 
1.80 
(1.50) 
2.64 
(.99) 
2.28 
(1.31) 
2.34 
(1.15) 
2.24 
(0.50) 
14.06  
(3.27) 
Builders 
N = 25 
7.24 
(4.47) 
2.82 
(0.50) 
1.92 
(1.47) 
2.28 
(1.31) 
2.04 
(1.43) 
1.50 
(1.37) 
2.26 
(0.66) 
12.8  
(4.26) 
Contrasts 
Z = .00 
p = 
1.000 
Z = -.40 
p = .687 
Z = -.29 
p = .773 
Z = -1.09 
p = .274 
Z = -.62 
p = .533 
Z = -
2.28 
p = 
.023 * 
Z = -.37 
p = .710 
Z =  -
.79 
p = 
.431 
High scores 
on 
cooperation 
N = 26 
10.50 
(3.64) 
2.77 
(0.55) 
2.77 
(0.82) 
2.88 
(0.59) 
2.65 
(0.98) 
2.25 
(1.14) 
2.46 
(0.49) 
15.79 
(2.28) 
Low scores 
on 
cooperation 
N = 24 
3.71 
(1.52) 
2.81 
(0.51) 
0.87 
(1.39) 
2.00 
(1.44) 
1.62 
(1.53) 
1.56 
(1.43) 
2.02 
(0.60) 
10.90 
(3.51) 
Contrasts 
Z = -
6.07 
p = 
.000 * 
Z = -.29 
p = .771 
Z = -4.55 
p = .000 * 
Z = -2.68 
P = .007 * 
Z = -2.67 
p = .008 * 
Z = -
1.74 
p = 
.082 
Z = -2.62 
p = .009 * 
Z = -
4.50 
p = 
.000 * 
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Note: range of the cooperation task = 0-18; range in each ToM task = 0-3; range of the total 
ToM score = 0-18 (*) means p = < .05 
 
Discussion 
 
In sum, the results of our study show that ToM skills are linked to 
effectiveness in the collaborative task. In addition, they provide more 
accurate data regarding some aspects of the relationship between ToM and 
cooperation. 
First, the descriptive results from Table 2 show that first-grade 
participants had higher difficulty in solving all the tasks, except for the 
unexpected content task, which is usually worked out from the age of 4 years 
(Wellman and Liu, 2004), and therefore this may be explained by a ceiling 
effect.  
In the rest of the tasks fifth-grade participants scored higher than first-
graders. It is especially remarkable the low score on the second-order false 
belief task (change of location), since results from other studies indicate a 
higher level of accomplishment at the age of 6, but this could be explained in 
terms of the task version (see, for example: Perner & Howes, 1992; Wimmer 
& Perner, 1985). Now, we must take into account that fifth-graders do 
performance well on this task, so our version seems to discriminate 
participants adequately according to their abilities. On the other hand, in 
terms of cooperation abilities, we found that fifth-graders doubled the score 
of the first-graders. 
Regarding our first hypothesis, correlations showed that there is a 
significant relationship between ToM scores and performance on the 
cooperative task, though the strength of this relationship is moderate and 
mainly reflected in the second-order false belief task (change of location). 
Now, if we take into account the role of the participants, the results were 
more specific. In the case of the builders, success in cooperation was 
significantly related to the tasks of deception and change of location (after 
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controlling age), as well as to the total ToM score. Furthermore, the intensity 
of the correlations was, in this case, high. On the contrary, in the case of the 
guides, no correlation between ToM and cooperation as found to be 
significant (controlling the effect of age). These results suggest that, in the 
cooperative task used in this research, ToM skills are important mainly in 
the case of the builders, where participants receive information and have to 
decide and request which information is necessary to resolve the task. 
Moreover, the results indicate which ToM skills are involved in the 
cooperation activity, mainly understanding second-order false beliefs and 
deception. 
These two abilities have been related by some authors to executive 
functioning skills (fundamentally with working memory), and could be 
regarded as part of the more cognitive part of the ToM (Tirapu-Ustárroz et 
al., 2007), as opposed to a more socioemotional component, which would 
include skills such as emotional attribution and faux-pas understanding. 
Concerning the ToM scores as a function of the role of the participants, 
we observed a significant difference in favour of the guides. However, this 
difference occurs only in the faux-pas task and it is not reflected in the total 
ToM score. Therefore, overall, there are no differences in ToM scores 
between guides and builders, or at least not in the more cognitive component 
of ToM, as the faux-pas understanding may be considered as being part of 
the more emotional or moral component. 
Attending to the success in the cooperative task (see Table 3), we 
observed that participants with high scores on cooperation obtained greater 
ToM scores than participants with low scores on cooperation. That is, the 
pairs with greater results in the cooperative activity also obtained 
significantly higher scores in the ToM tasks, except for the unexpected 
content task and the faux-pas task. In the former, most of the children pass 
the task, and therefore no differences between groups were observed. In 
relation to the faux-pas task, we had obtained different results for builders 
and guides, and now we observed differences as a function of cooperative 
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success. Despite we cannot explain that, these two results could be related. 
However, it is also possible that the type of skill underlying the faux-pas is 
not directly related to the success in the cooperative activity. 
In conclusion, the ToM is strongly related to the ability to cooperate 
successfully, as already observed in other studies (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007; 
Takagishi et al., 2010). What's more, in our study we found that to be so 
regardless of age. Besides, our results suggest that different skills may be 
involved in this relationship, mainly advanced cognitive ToM skills, as 
shown by the performance on the second-order false belief task (change of 
location). Unlike previous studies focused on a single task (Takagishi et al., 
2010; Krych-Applebaum et al., 2007), our study highlights the relationship 
between ToM and cooperation through various ToM tasks (in ages not 
investigated before), and indicate that the ToM skills needed to cooperate 
effectively may vary as a function of role of the participants (speaker vs. 
receiver). 
Finally, we suggest that the relationship between ToM skills and 
cooperation found in this work should be studied in the future through: (a) 
the design of various cooperative tasks, beyond those of referential 
communication, (b) the control of the ToM skills of the different 
participants, in a way that allowed to observe how the interaction of different 
mentalistic patterns affects the results of cooperative interactions; and (c) the 
consideration of other variables such as language, executive functions and 
motivation to cooperate. Then again, there is also a need to deepen the 
concept of ToM in order to clarify how and to what extent their various 
components are involved in the ability to cooperate. 
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Appendixes  
 
Appendix A  
 
Theory of mind tasks 
 
a. First-order false belief (unexpected content) 
The experimenter shows a closed tube of Lacasitos ® and says: "Look, here 
I have this tube". After showing the tube the experimenter asks: "What do 
you think there is inside the tube?" 
Then the experimenter opens the tube and shows its real content: "Let's 
see... Look! There are actually pebbles in the tube!" 
After that the experimenter closes the tube and asks:  "What did you 
think there was inside the tube before opening it?" Then he also asks a 
control question: "And what's actually inside the tube?" The experimenter 
continues explaining: "Imagine that now comes X (a fellow of the 
participant). X has never seen what's inside the tube. If we show him/her the 
closed tube as we have it now, what will X think there is inside the tube? " 
The child is also asked to justify his/her answer: "Why will X say that?" 
A final control question is made: "Has X seen what's inside the tube?"  
 
b. Second-order false belief (change of location) 
We show the photograph and start explaining: "John and Mary are in the 
fair. John wants to go on the wheel. Mary does not want to go on the wheel 
and goes to the carousel. When John sees that the cue for the wheel is very 
long, he decides to go to the haunted house. When Mary leaves the carousel 
she goes to look for John." 
Then, the experimenter asks: "Where will Mary look for John?" 
And "Why will Mary go to that place?” 
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After that the experimenter says: "But really, when Mary was on the 
carousel she saw that John was going to the haunted house. John did not see 
that Mary was watching him”. 
Then the experimenter asks the second-order false belief question: 
"Where does John think Mary will look for him?" Why does John think 
that?" 
Finally, three control questions are made: “Did Mary see John going to 
the haunted house?” “Did John see that Mary was watching?” And “at the 
beginning of the story, where did John want to go?" 
 
c. Deception 
The experimenter starts saying: "Now I will explain a story of two brothers, 
Marta and Peter. Marta is a liar and his brother Peter knows that Marta is a 
liar and never tells the truth. One day Martha took, without permission, 
Peter‟s ball. Peter was sure Marta had hidden his ball somewhere, but could 
not find it. Peter was very angry. Then Peter met Marta and asked her: 
„Where's my ball? You have hidden my ball either in your closet or under 
your bed, because I have looked everywhere and I didn‟t find it. Where is it: 
in your closet or under your bed?‟ Then Marta said that the ball was hidden 
under her bed.” 
After explaining that story the experimenter asks: "Why will Peter go to 
get the ball in the closet?" And finally he asks the memory control question: 
"Where did Marta say she had hidden the ball?” 
 
d. Metaphor 
The experimenter shows a photo with two twin sisters and says: “Paula and 
Ruth are sisters. Her mother says that “they are like two drops of water”. 
Then the experimenter asks: “What does the mother mean?” 
 
 
 
 International Journal of Educational Psychology, 2(3) 
 
 
349 
e. Faux-pas 
The experimenter explains the following story: "Cristina gave Manuel a 
plane for his birthday. Some months later, Cristina and Manuel were playing 
with the plane and Cristina accidentally broke the plane. „Sorry‟ said 
Cristina. And Manuel said, "Don‟t worry. I never liked this plane. Someone 
gave it to me for my birthday. " 
After explaining the story the experimenter asked three questions of faux-
pas detection: “In the story, did anyone say something they shouldn't have 
said or something awkward?” “Who said it?” and “What did he/she say?” 
The experimenter continued with the following question: “Did Manuel 
want Cristina to feel bad?” 
The next question was: "And, what did Cristina feel like?" 
Finally, two control questions were asked: “What did Cristina give 
Manuel for his birthday?” And "Did Manuel remember that Cristina had 
given him a plane?" 
 
f. Emotional attribution 
The experimenter starts saying: "The images I'll show are images of a girl 
named Julia. I'll show you some pictures about Julia turned back and about 
what happens to her. After looking at each of the images we will look at four 
photographs and you will have to tell me what photograph shows how Julia 
feels in the situation". 
Before administering the six test images, there was a trial item (Julia fell 
off her bike and got hurt): "Let's make a trial. Look at this picture. This is 
Julia and here there are the 4 photos with different expressions of Julia. Point 
to the face that best shows us how Julia feels here". 
If the child answers correctly the experimenter says: "Very good ! Now 
we will look at another picture". 
If the child is wrong the experimenter says: "This is not correct. In the 
picture we see that Julia is hurt. This face shows us how Julia feels when she 
is hurt". 
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Afterwards the experimenter administers the 6 items. It is important to say 
that no feedback is given nor it is explained the situation to the participant, 
who is shown each of the situations and is asked to indicate the correct 
photograph. The experimenter only shows each of the test images to the 
child, and asks him/her about the correct photograph.  
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Appendix B 
 
Cooperative task 
 
After placing each pair of participants in front of each other, with the opaque 
screen in the middle, the experimenter said: "A (name of participant) is on 
this side of the screen and B (name of participant) on this other side. We put 
this screen in the middle of the table so that you cannot see what the other 
person is doing. So you cannot lift, or move the screen or show things above 
the screen. Only, you could see each other‟s eyes". 
 
Then the experimenter explained the purpose of the task: "A has a model 
made with building blocks and B has a base and many pieces to build. 
Without looking at what the other is doing, the two of you will have to build 
the same model that now A has. You have to build the model as quick as 
possible. Both of you can talk, but you cannot look. When you finish the 
model you will have to say "we're done". 
 
Finally, the role of the researcher was clarified: "I will not be able to speak 
or to help." When participants requested the assistance of the experimenter, 
she answered them: "you two have to build the same model that now A has. 
Both of you can talk, but you cannot look”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
